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You Have the Right To Criticize This
Casenote: Protecting Negative Reviews
Within the Law of Defamation and the
First Amendment
Moldea v. New York Times Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Moldea v. New York Times Co., the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals attempted to determine under what circumstances a statement labeled
as opinion may be the basis for a defamation suit.
The court approached the topic with some difficulty, as the United States
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.2 had
created confusion in lower courts over not only the validity of several
traditional tests used to distinguish between fact and opinion, but also as to
whether placing statements in an opinion context provides them with blanket
protection from liability, regardless of their content. The three-judge panel
deciding the case demonstrated the evolving nature of this facet of defamation
law when it reversed itself less than three months after an earlier decision in
the same matter.3
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Dan E. Moldea, author of the non-fiction book Interference: How
Organized Crime Influences Professional Football ("Interference"), sued The
New York Times Company ("the Times") for libel and invasion of privacy,
alleging a negative review of his book in the Times' book review section was
defamatory. Specifically, Moldea charged that several statements by the
reviewer, including one that the book contained "too much sloppy journalism"
to be trusted, were "sufficiently factual to be reasonably capable of being
proved false, or that they impl[ied] undisclosed assertions of fact that are
capable of being proved false or misleading."4 Moldea sought damages for
1. 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.) [hereinafter Moldeal], rev'd, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.)
[hereinafter Moldea BI], cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994).
2. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
3. Moldea , 22 F.3d at 320.
4. Moldeav. New York Times Co., 793 F. Supp. 335, 336 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd,
15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202
(1994). Moldea was suing under the District of Columbia's definition of defamation,
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the review's detrimental effect on his career as an author, lecturer and
investigative journalist.5
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the
Times' motion for summary judgment.6 The court accepted the newspaper's
defense that the statements in question were unverifiable opinions, which were
not actionable under the First Amendment.'
The court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the lower court,
remanding on the basis that passages of the review implied verifiable facts that
a reasonable juror could find false.' Furthermore, the court held the
statements were not protected merely by their inclusion in a book review, one
of many fora "well known for spirited expressions of personal opinion.19
The Times filed a petition for rehearing, but rather than allowing the
argument to be heard before the court en banc, the original panel reversed
itself,a0  a move commentators termed both "unusual"" and
"extraordinary."'12  Writing that he had "fall[en] prey to an error of
judgment,"13 Judge Harry T. Edwards, along with Judge Patricia M. Wald,
concurred with Chief Judge Abner J. Mikva, who had dissented in the earlier
case. The opinion noted that while reviews are not per se exempt from
defamation suits, the court was incorrect not to consider the context in which
the statements appeared." "Thus, when a reviewer offers commentary that
is tied to the work being reviewed, and that is a supportable interpretation of
the author's work, that interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of fact
that can be actionable in defamation."' 5
which comes from case law and describes it as any statement that "tends to injure
plaintiff in his trade, profession or community standing, or lower him in the estimation
of the community." Moldeal, 15 F.3d at 1142.
5. Moldea, 15 F.3d at 1140.
6. Moldea, 793 F. Supp. at 337.
7. Id.
8. Moldea, 15 F.3d at 1145-49.
9. Id. at 1146 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
10. Moldea , 22 F.3d at 310.
11. CA DC Changes Mind On Libel Standard For Critical Comments In Book
Reviews, 62 U.S.L.W. 2684 (May 10, 1994).
12. News notes, DC CircuitAmends Decisionln "Shoddy Journalism"Action, 22
Media L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19 (May 10, 1994).
13. Moldea , 22 F.3d at 311.








A. Distinction Between Fact and Opinion Pre-Milkovich"6
At common law, the impossibility of proving the truthfulness of certain
statements of opinion did not preclude making them the basis of a defamation
suit." Instead, defendants could respond that their statements were "fair
comment-the privilege of stating opinions that they actually held and did not
express solely for the purpose of hurting the object of the attack.""8
Yet the fair comment doctrine was only "a qualified privilege," restrictive
in its coverage.19 A defendant invoking the privilege had to prove not only
his belief and lack of intention to harm the subject, but also that the criticism
"was... of legitimate public interest" based on facts given to or known by
the receiver.2"
The doctrine was, however, successfullyusedto fend off libel cases based
on a defendant's criticism of another's literary work. For example, in Berg
v. Printers' Ink Publishing Co.,21 a psychiatrist alleged an article criticizing
two of his own published pieces was libelous due to numerous statements that
were false and damaging to his "ability and integrity in his profession."22
The court dismissed the complaint, holding that allowing "fair and honest
criticism" was especially appropriate in the discussion of "any work to which
the attention of the public has been invited."' Not only was such criticism
to be expected, but it was protected under the fair comment doctrine.' The
court explained that such "honest comment or criticism" was not actionable as
16. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The decision in
Milkovichwas a turning point inthe Supreme Court's efforts to clarify the fact/opinion
distinction. See discussion infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
17. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., TMHE FIRST AMENDMmNT AND THE FOURTH
ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA 83 (4th ed. 1988).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. RESTATmMNT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 606 (1938), cited in Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 974 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21. 54 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
22. Id. at 799.
23. Id. at 797.
24. Id. at 796-97. In addition to the requirements that the comment be based on
disclosedfacts, not intended to harm the subject, the honest opinion of the speaker, and
of legitimate public interest, the court added that the criticism must be "free from
imputations of corrupt or dishonest motives on the part of the person whose work is
criticized." Id. at 797.
1995]
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libel, so long as the facts supporting the opinion were "correctly stated," even
if "the comment or criticism... is not reasonably warranted by the facts."25
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had reached a similar
conclusion when faced with a plaintiff's allegation that a criticism imputed
that his magazine "was and is of Nazi character."26 The court dismissed this
plaintiff's claim, noting the metaphoricalnature of the statement in context "is
not a proposition of fact."'27 Further, any comment or criticism of published
work made without "bad faith or bad motive" was protected regardless of
whether such commentary was "neither false nor demonstrably true."2
The United States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional
significance of the fair comment doctrine in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' its seminal decision dictating the rights of public officials as
plaintiffs in defamation actions." In a footnote, the Court stated that "a
defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest expression of opinion
based upon. . . true ... statements of fact."31
Although the Sullivan decision did not require the Court to deal with
protection of opinions labeled as such, it has been argued that its main
holding-requiring public officials to prove actual malice before recovering
for false statements of fact---paved the way for the clarification of an
opinion privilege "by revolutionizing the treatment of libel law under the
[FWirst [A]mendment."
33
Sullivan was decided with a focus on "a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks"34 on its targets, which were at the time limited
to "government and public officials. "M Against this "background,'" 36 the
Court elected to give limited protection to "erroneous statements honestly
25. Id.
26. Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
27. Id. at 735.
28. Id.
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. See Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the
Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 764 (1990).
31. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292 n.30.
32. Id. at 278-80.
33. Jeffley E. Thomas, Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and
the First Amendment, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1986).
34. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 270.
35. Id. The Court later expanded the protection to cover "public figures." See
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
36. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
[Vol. 60
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made,"37 absent proof that they were made with knowing falsity or a reckless
disregard for their truth." The Court's intention was to avoid a conundrum
in which citizens refrain from speaking on matters of public concern "even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so, '0 9 resulting only in the repression of "public debate.i
40
The Sullivan Court had clearly expanded the protection of the
Constitution to cover some defamatory statements. But it went further,
essentially adopting what had been a minority view of the fair comment
doctrine whereby the disclosure of true facts was immaterial to the privilege
of the opinion expressed."
A decade later, the Court, perhaps unintentionally,42 greatly expanded
the protection for opinions that it had only alluded to in Sullivan. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch,43 while defining the rights of private individuals suing for
libel, Justice Powell included two sentences in his majority opinion concerning
the protection of opinion: "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas. " 44 This brief excerpt, well acknowledged as dicta,45 became
the rationale for some lower courts, both state and federal,46 to "establish an
absolute constitutional privilege for statements of opinion."4
B. Distinguishing Fact From Opinion: The Post-Gertz Tests
The protective net ostensibly tossed over this class of language, however,
did not stop most courts from engaging in a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the speech at issue was opinion or fact.4
Some courts suggested that tests to distinguish whether an opinion is
actionable hinge upon whether the false facts implied are accusations of
37. Id. at 278.
38. Id. at 279-80.
39. Id. at 279.
40. Id.
41. See WiLLAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 820 (4th
ed. 1971), cited in Thomas, supra note 33, at 1003.
42. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
43. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
44. Id. at 339-40.
45. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 974.
46. See Ott, infra note 30, at 765 n.21 (collecting cases).
47. Ott, supra note 30, at 765.
48. Olman, 750 F.2d at 977.
1995]
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criminal or quasi-criminal conduct.49 Others, however, emphasized that true
opinions are impossible to prove." This strict "verifiability" test5" requires
a court to first determine "whether the language used is so imprecise or vague
that it has no generally accepted core of meaning." 2  If so, it is
protected."53 If not, the court then decides if the statement may be "proven
objectively."54 If it cannot, it "is protected opinion."55
Such a test was utilized by the Second Circuit in Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche.56 In Hotchner, the court of appeals held an author's negative
characterizationof the plaintiff's friendship with Ernest Hemingway could not
be proven false and was therefore protected as opinion.
57
The Hotchner court also found basis for its conclusion in that the
defendant author had not implied in his comments he was "privy to facts about
the [plaintiff] that are unknown to the reader."5" This is the foundation of
the Second Restatement's test, used by most lower courts in the wake of
Gertz.59 According to the Restatement, an expression of opinion is
"actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as
the basis for the opinion."'  This approach was endorsed by not only
numerous state and federal courts but arguably the Supreme Court as well.61
Perhaps the most practicaltests were those that considered various factors
beyond the verifiability of the opinion or the disclosure of facts on which it
49. See Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1983).
50. CARTER ET AL., supra note 17, at 85.
51. Thomas, supranote 33, at 1017.
52. Thomas, supra note 33, at 1017.
53. Thomas, supra note 33, at 1017.
54. Thomas, supra note 33, at 1017.
55. Thomas, supra note 33, at 1017.
56. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
57. Id. at 913. In a book about Hemingway, the author described the plaintiff,
among other labels, as a "manipulator," a "toady," a "two-faced... hypocrite," and
an "exploiter." Id. at 912.
58. Id. at 913.
59. Thomas, supranote 33, at 1011 n.70 (collecting cases).
60. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). The classic example the
Restatement uses involves A writing to B about his neighbor C: "I think [C] must be
an alcoholic." The commentary accompanying the illustration suggests that this
expression of opinion "implied that A knew undisclosed facts" about C and therefore
may be actionable. Id. illus. 3.
61. Thomas, supra note 33, at 1014-15 (citing Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'nv. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970)). Thomas states the decisions in the above cases "may have turned on the
full disclosure of the facts in the" statements at issue. Id.
[Vol. 60
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is based. These tests, known as "multi-factor"'62 or "totality of the
circumstances"'63 tests, took several facets of the purported opinion and
balanced them in an effort to determine whether it was actionable.
For example, in Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer
Corp.', the court looked at three factors of the challenged statement:" "the
facts surrounding the publication,"66 the audience's possible perception of it
as an attempt at persuasion through "epithets, .. . rhetoric or hyperbole,"'6
and whether the statement was "'cautiously phrased in terms of apparency' or
is of a kind typically generated in a spirited legal dispute ... [so that] the
statement is less likely to be understood as a statement of fact rather than as
a statement of opinion."6
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in an effort to provide a
clearer means of distinguishing between the two types of speech,69 created
another multi-factor test, incorporating four factors to assess "'whether the
average reader would view the statement', as fact or... opinion."7
First, the court analyzed "the common usage or meaning of the specific
language of the challenged statement" in an effort to determine whether it had
"a precise core of meaning" or was "indefinite and ambiguous."'" Second,
the court "consider[ed] the statement's verifiability" to determine whether it
was "capable of being objectively characterized as true or false."72 Third, the
court examined "the full context" in which the statement appeared, including
the immediate surrounding words. 3 Finally, the court looked at "the broader
62. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 6 1 1 F.2d 781 (9th
Cir. 1980).
63. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979.
64. 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).
65. The defendant, a marketer of electronics products, had issued an attorney's
statement and a press release accusing the plaintiff, a manufacturer, of filing a breach
of contract suit as a "device" to avoid payment of monies due the defendant. Id. at
783.
66. Id. at 783-84.
67. Id. at 784.
68. Id. (quoting Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas, 552 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1976)).
69. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 977-78. In Oilman, a political science professor sued
two popular newspaper columnists for reporting an anonymous source's statement that
the professor "has no status within the profession" and "is a pure and simple activist."
Id. at 973.
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context or setting," such as the type of writing, "in which the statement
appears.w
74
These tests were applied repeatedly between 1974 and 1990, in some
cases upon facts similar to those in Moldea.75 For example, in Cole v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,76 a reporter sued his former employer for
statements that he was fired because of "sloppy and irresponsible reporting"
and "a history of bad reporting techniques. '77 In its analysis of whether the
statement was fact or opinion, the court used the Information Control test78
and "examine[d] the statement in its totality in the context in which it was
uttered."'79 After doing so, the court held the statements "could not
reasonably be viewed as statements of fact.180
In what would appear to be extremely persuasive authority for the
Moldea decisions, the court wrote that "[w]hether a reporter is sloppy and
irresponsible with bad techniques is a matter of opinion. The meaning of
these statements is imprecise and open to speculation." '
Courts also used the multi-factor tests to protect reviewers critical of
another's product. In Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S. A.,' the
Second Circuit switched from analyzing the strict verifiability of the
statements at issue' and employed a multi-factor test to determine whether
statements in a restaurant review were libelous.' The court looked at the
immediate and broad context of the statements, their objective verifiability,
and the possible existence of undisclosed defamatory facts.85 In holding that
74. Id. Judges Wald and Edwards, who constituted the majority in both Moldea
landII, both dissented on essentiallythe same grounds, agreeing with the multi-factor
analysis employed by the court but disagreeing as to whether all of the statements at
issue were not actionable. Id. at 1032, 1035.
75. See, e.g., Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir. 1985); Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 435 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982).
76. 435 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 1982).
77. Id. at 1023.
78. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
79. Cole, 435 N.E.2d at 1025 (quoting Information Control, 611 F.2d at 784).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1027.
82. 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
83. A French restaurant guide had lambasted a Chinese restaurant inNew York,
describing the various dishes as "heavy and greasy," "disturbingly gamy," "badly
cooked," "rubbery," and "totally insipid." Id. at 221. "We do not know where Mr.
Chow recruits his cooks," the reviewer wrote, "but he would do well to send them for
instruction somewhere in Chinatown." Id. at 222.
84. Id. at 226.
85. Id. at 225.
[Vol. 60
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none of the statements were actionable, the court gave a great deal of weight
to the fact that the statements appeared in the context of a review, "the well
recognized home of opinion and comment."86 The court wrote "reviews,
although they may be unkind, are not normally a breeding ground for
successful libel actions"' even in cases where the reviewer's opinion is
"unreasonable."'
C. Milkovich and Its Progeny
In 1990, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co." The Court held the First Amendment does not provide
an exemption from defamation suits for statements merely labeled as
opinions9" particularly in situations where the opinions "imply an assertion
of objective fact."'"
The Court found that a newspaper columnist implied a high school
wrestling coach committed perjury.' The Court stated that no separate
protection was necessary in light of precedent which gave "full constitutional
protection" to opinions "relating to matters of public concern which [do] not
contain a provably false factual connotation."' In addition, the protection
afforded to statements such as "hyperbole" or "imaginative expression" that
could not "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts" about an
individual remained intact under Milkovich.94
The Court noted that its rationale was consistent with Sullivan and its
progeny, holding that freedom of expression requires adequate "breathing
space" to avoid the perils of self-censorship.95 Such freedom, however, "is
86. Id. at 227. "
87. Id. at 228. See also id. at 228 n.7 (collecting cases).
88. Id. at 229.
89. 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see text accompanying supra note 2.
90. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
See also OldDominion Branch No. 496,418 U.S. at 284-86 (calling non-union "scab"
a "traitor" was not actionable in sense used); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, 398
U.S. at 13-14 (use of "blackmail" to describe developer's proposal was "rhetorical
hyperbole" and nonactionable).
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adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of
an artificial dichotomy bdtween 'opinion' and fact."96
Nevertheless, the decision spurred immediate criticism, with one article
charging the decision created an ambiguity that could lead to a chilling effect
on the media,' even though the Court's standard was "essentially the same
as that the lower courts have used for years to distinguish between fact and
opinion.*198
Following Milkovich, lower courts appeared to struggle in determining
whether previous tests to differentiate between opinion and fact retained any
validity.' Perhaps not surprisingly, most courts recognized the absence of
a per se exemption for opinion but still felt free to use totality of the
circumstances and objective verifiability tests to determine whether a
challenged statement was fact or opinion."0
Some decisions, however, concluded that multi-factor tests in which the
strength of one factor-such as context-could protect an otherwise actionable
statement could no longer be used in light of Milkovich."' For example,
when television commentator Andy Rooney stated that a product "didn't
work," his statement was not protected solely because of the humorous nature
of the report in which he made it."° Rather, Rooney escaped liability only
because the plaintiff was unable to prove the falsity of the comment."'
Other courts disagreed and stated that the Milkovich decision did not
forbid the evaluation of context in determining whether a statement is fact or
opinion, but rather "indicated that the context in which language appears must
be evaluated to see whether 'the general tenor"' of a piece can overcome the
defamatory impression conveyed by the words at issue."
Furthermore, and of eventual importance to theMoldeaII decision, courts
appeared to agree that when a statement was merely an interpretation of a set
96. Id.
97. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-LeadingCases, 104 HARv. L. REV. 219, 224
(1990).
98. Id. at 223.
99. See Robert C. Vordaret et al., Media Law and Defamation Torts: Recent
Developments, A Supreme Court Decision Applied: The Effect of Milkovich on
Opinion Cases in the Lower and Federal Courts, 27 ToRT & INs. L.J. 333, 339
(1992).
100. See, e.g., Kumaran v. Brotman, 617 N.E.2d 191, 200 (ll. App. Ct. 1993).
101. See Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 961 (1991).
102. Id. at 1054.
103. Id. at 1057.
104. Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir.
1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21).
[Vol. 60
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of objective facts, it could not be sued upon as defamatory."' 5 Such an
analysis was considered "consistent with" Milkovich."'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Moldea I
In Moldea I, the two-judge"0 7 majority held the Times' review could
injure Moldea in his profession as an investigative journalist,05 thereby
bringing it under the District of Columbia's case-law definition of
defamation."° However, the court still had to address the issue of whether
the statements were objectively verifiable or implied provable facts, and
"whether a reasonable juror could find them to be false.""n0
The court looked to Milkovich in establishing a rule that "an unsupported
statement of opinion that implies defamatory facts" is capable of a defamatory
meaning" and that even where a speaker discloses the facts on which his
opinion is based, it may still be actionable if the facts disclosed "are either
incorrect or incomplete." '
In addressing the portion of the complaint which dealt with the charge of
"sloppy journalism," the court acknowledged that "sloppy" is generally a
nebulous term but it "has obvious, measurable aspects when applied to the
field of investigative journalism."'1 3 Judge Edwards then analogized that
"sloppy" is to a journalist as an accusation of having "clumsy hands" is to a
surgeon,"' and the use of such "arguably imprecise terms" alone cannot
justify the attack on another's work "without substantiating [the] charges with
facts.'1
5
105. Id. at 730. See also Fortier v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
2327, 605 A.2d 79, 80 (Me. 1992); Immuno AG v. J. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d
1270, 1273-74 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
106. Fortier, 605 A.2d at 80.
107. Circuit Judges Harry T. Edwards and Patricia M. Wald.
108. Moldea, 15 F.3d at 1143.
109. Id. at 1142 (defining a statement as defamatory "if it tends to injure plaintiff
in his trade, profession or community standing, or lower him in the estimation of the
community").
110. Id. at 1143.
111. Id. at 1144.
112. Id. (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19).
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The court went on to say that the location of the statements in a book
review did not alter its analysis. 6 "[I]t would make little sense to craft a
rule that permitted otherwise libelous statements to go unchecked so long as
they appeared in certain sacrosanct genres."'1 7 This statement was clarified
by dismissing any suggestion "that all bad reviews are actionable." ' The
court held only "that assertions [which] would otherwise be actionable in
defamation are not transmogrified into nonactionable statements when they
appear in the context of a book review.""' To avoid liability, the Times
was required to show the opinion expressed about Moldea's work was
supported by "true facts."
120
The court then explored the five examples the Times gave in its review
as examples of Moldea's alleged sloppy work.' It held that two were
assertions of fact that a reasonable juror could find to be false.12 The case
was remanded to the district court for resolution of these issues."
116. Id. at 1145-46.




121. Id. at 1145-50. The five statements in the review which Moldea argued
supported his libel charge were:
1. Moldea's book falsely described Joe Hirsch as the author of "an inside
information sheet." Moldea contended that the passage was in fact true, making the
Times' statement otherwise "verifiably false." Id. at 1141.
2. Moldea's book falsely described a "sinister" meeting between New York Jets'
quarterback Joe Namath and Baltimore Colts' placekicker Lou Michaels shortly before
the Jets victory in Super Bowl II. Moldea argued that his book described the meeting
as innocent. Id.
3. Moldea's book revived a "discredited notion" that the owner of the Los
Angeles Rams' drowning deathwas due to foul play. Moldea claimed the book stated
the exact opposite. Id.
4. Moldea's book implied that the Colts' failure to attempt a field goal late in a
1958 playoff game was an attempt to beat the point spread, ignoring the fact that the
Colts' kicker was one of the league's worst. In fact, Moldea included in his book a
footnote that Baltimore had the NFL's second-worst field goal percentage that year.
Id. at 1141-42.
5. Moldea's book included "some really hot stuff ... albeit wanned over."
Moldea's claim was that this statement was provably false given that "his book
contains significant new revelations." Id. at 1142.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court also reinstated Moldea's claim for false light invasion of
privacy, concluding the district court had applied an improper standard in dismissing
it. Id. at 1150-51.
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In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner J. Mikva traced the
development of the opinion privilege through Milkovich, noting the factors
previously considered by the court in Olman-including context-were still
"relevant but only to the extent they bear on the verifiability of the
statement.'
24
The dissent discussed the inherent subjectivity of terms like sloppy, and
concluded such words defy objective verifiability." "[B]ecause the burden
of proving that an allegedly defamatory statement is false lies with the
plaintiff, defendants should prevail in cases like this where the verifiability of
the statements at issue is doubtful.12 6 Mikva also explored the context of
the statements, and while he agreed "a wholesale defamation privilege for
statements appearing in literary or artistic criticism" went too far, 27 he felt
that subjective comments in a review did not raise the same concerns as
opinions implying facts in other forums.121 Such statements often have an
imprecise meaning"' or are clearly non-verifiable "general assessments" of
the reviewer, "the subjective interpretation of one person.""'
In the dissent's view, the majority was ignoring "a long history of
defamation jurisprudence which recognizes that reviews are generally offered,
and reasonably received, as statements of subjective, non-verifiable opinion
rather than fact."'' With regard to the specific statements offered as
support for the Times' opinion, the dissent agreed that the reviewer's
characterization was "open to debate" but that this did not alter the
impossibility of verifying it.
132
124. Id. at 1154 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. The dissenttook exception to the majority's view that calling ajournalist
sloppy was akin to charging a brain surgeon with having clumsy hands. Such an
analogy "is to equate a piano recital with medical malpractice." Id. at 1152.
126. Id. at 1555.
127. Id. at 1156.
128. Id. at 1155.
129. Id. at 1155-56 (citing Cole, 435 N.E.2d at 1027).
130. Id. at 1156 (citing Stuart v. Gambling Times, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 170, 172
(D.N.J. 1982) and Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219,
226-29 (2d Cir. 1985)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1157.
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B. Moldea II
The Times responded to Moldea I with a petition for an en banc
rehearing of the case." Yet before the court ruled on the petition, the
majority reversed its order remanding the case, reinstating the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Times.' The court wrote it had
carefully considered its original opinion and concluded it
failed to take sufficient account of the fact that the statements at issue
appeared in the context of a book review, a genre in which readers expect
to find spirited critiques of literary works that they understand to be the
reviewer's description and assessmentof texts that are capable of a number
of possible rational interpretations.135
The court reaffirmed its earlier contention that statements in book reviews
could be actionable.16 The recognized error, however, was its failure to
consider the forum in which the statements were printed is one "in which
readers expect to find such evaluations.' 13' Therefore, the court ruled,
"when a reviewer offers commentary that is [1] tied to the work being
reviewed, and [2]... is a supportable interpretation of the author's work, that
interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of fact that can be actionable
in defamation. 1 38
In its analysis, the court recognized its previous error and sided with
other circuits in holding the Milkovich decision had not dismissed the
relevance of context in determining whether a challenged statement was fact
or opinion.139 In fact, the court wrote, the setting of certain speech "helps
determine the way in which the intended audience will receive" it.'4 Thus,
a "supportable interpretation standard" is the proper means by which
commentary such as literary criticism should be analyzed in ruling whether a
cause of action for defamation exists."' Such a standard does not give a
literary critic free reign to make derogatory statements about a subject, but
133. News Notes, supra note 12.
134. Moldea I, 22 F.3d at 320.
135. Id. at 311.
136. Id. at 313.
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 314 (citing Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d
724, 729 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992)). See also supranotes 100, 104 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 315.
[Vol. 60
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/4
PROTECTING NEGATIVE REVIEWS
does allow the "breathing space" required by the constitution for opinionated
works in certain fora.'42
To meet the "supportable interpretation" requirement, a defendant's work
must be supportable by references to the text he is criticizing.' Within this
interpretation, a choice of language that reasonable people may believe is a
misconception of the work described does not provide a cause of action.
1 44
The review at issue satisfied this new standard.'45 The court did not
expressly rebut its contention in Moldea I that the reviewer's statement
regarding Moldea's alleged "sloppy journalism" may be verifiable. 146 The
critic had, however, revealed the premises for his belief-to wit, Moldea's
book itself.147  Given that a reader understood the subjective conclusions
expressed were those of the critic and realized she could draw her own
conclusions based upon the same premises, the statements were protected.
148
The court concluded the correct test of whether a statement was actionable
was not whether any reasonable juror could find the facts supporting the
verifiable opinion to be false, but rather whether any reasonable juror could
find the statements were not supportable interpretations of the written
work.149 Although at least one of the passages relied upon by the reviewer
was interpreted in a troubling manner, 50 the true statements, and supported
opinions and supportable interpretations justified the overall assessment that
Moldea's book included "sloppy journalism.' 15'
V. COMMENT
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has molded defamation law against
the background of the First Amendment, with concomitant goals of protecting
both the marketplace of ideas and the vigorous debate that shall inevitably
accompany it. 52 Inherent in this process is the theory that no one should
142. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 315-16 (citing Massonv. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,
519 (1991)).
145. Id. at 317.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 144-45).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 318. The court was referring to the reviewer's characterization of
Moldea's alleged description of the Namath meeting as "sinister." Id.
151. Id. at 319. In addition, the court dismissed its earlier reinstatement of
Moldea's false light invasion of privacy claim.
152. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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be punished with civil or criminal liability merely for expressing distaste with
a matter of public concern. This protection has been held to extend even to
statements that include some false content.153 The Moldea cases represent
an appellate court's efforts to reconcile these goals with another goal of equal
importance: that a person's reputation should not be fair game for defamation
by the reckless or knowing dissemination of lies.
Moldea I! continues a trend that began with the fair comment
doctrine:.5 . providing broad protection for statements of opinion. In light
of Moldea 17, this protection, at least in the case of artistic criticism, will
extend even where the opinions are arguably misguided or based on a
misreading of their source.'55
Perhaps more importantly, the appellate court's final decision offered a
solution to the mystery resonating after Milkovich as to whether the context
in which a challenged statement appears is still relevant. The D.C. Circuit
found part of the answer in the text of Milkovich itself. In that case, the
majority opinion stated the "general tenor of the article" sued upon did not
negate an impression that the author was seriously maintaining his subject
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding.'56 Justice Brennan, in a dissenting
opinion, also stated the majority opinion recognized "the context in which
[language] is used may signal readers that an author is not purporting to state
or imply actual, known facts."'57 These passages clearly demonstrate, as the
First Circuit recognized in Phantom Touring,'58 that the Supreme Court
never dismissed the potential importance of context in certain cases.
Yet both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court were
justified in asserting that absolute freedom from liability should never attach
to the mere labeling of a statement as an opinion or its inclusion in one of the
genres well known for robust debate.5 9 Such a rule would lead to absurd
extensions of the First Amendment by giving those with the title of "critic"
carte blanche approval to impugn the character of any public figure on
virtually any matter without regard to the truth of the facts used to support
such an attack.
The apparent source of the confusion over the lengths to which courts
must go to protect "opinion" is Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz,6' in which
153. See id. at 271.
154. See discussion supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
155. See Moldea I, 22 F.3d at 319.
156. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990).
157. Id. at 25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724,729 n.9 (1st
Cir. 1992).
159. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; Moldea I, 22 F.3d at 311.
160. See supra note 43.
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he cited the First Amendment for the proposition that "there is no such thing
as a false idea." '161 Yet Powell arguably meant only that an individual's
expression of purely subjective thoughts, those that may not be proven false,
should not be punished by the government's judicial arm.'62 It is only when
such expressions imply false facts that they become subject to the established
Constitutional tests for defamation liability.
The idea that Milkovich overruled the Gertz dicta regarding protected
opinions therefore may be based on a faulty interpretation of the latter. 6
An examination of the legal history' reveals that opinions merely labeled
as such have never fully been afforded absolute protection, rebutting the
contention that Powell's language had been taken to its literal extreme. Under
the tests promulgated by various jurisdictions, ranging from the strict
verifiability approach a65 to the multi-factored analyses,'66 it is highly
unlikely that the simple words "in my opinion" or "I think" would ever
provide protection for an otherwise actionable statement. 61 The argument
that Milkovich simply reiterated the same fact versus opinion tests that had
been used by lower courts "for years"'68 thus appears to have some merit.
In a multi-factor test such as that used by the D.C. Circuit in Oilman,69
context may still provide the basis for a conclusion that a statement is indeed
protected opinion so long as it goes to the central question of whether the
statement implies a "provably false factual assertion."'10
The greater impact of the Moldea 11 opinion may be its prevention of the
chilling effect which the majority feared in Sullivan.7' A contrary decision
may have hindered the efforts of various media to provide spirited criticism
in clearly labeled reviews. Even the harshest commentator would be unlikely
to call a film director "amateurish," a rock singer "tone deaf' or an author
"careless" if the subjectivity of such terms could no longer be assumed. This
161. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
162. See generally Gordon Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory
"Opinions" to First Amendment Protected "Ideas", 43 Am.Z. L. REv. 57 (1990).
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 16-106 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
169. Ollmanv. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
170. Moyerv. Amador Valley Joint UnionIHigh Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 720,
724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
171. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
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fear may have encouraged several media outlets to join in the filing of an
amicus brief in support of the Times.172
Judicially-created defamation laws such as the District of Columbia's
could sound a death knell for critical reviews absent some type of privilege.
Such laws provide that defamatory statements include those that "[tend] to
injure plaintiff in his trade, profession or community standing, or lower him
in the estimation of the community." '73  Yet the purpose of negative
reviews, essentially, is to do just that which the law forbids. The Times book
reviewer, although presumably not acting with evil intent toward Moldea, was
telling thousands of newspaper readers Moldea had written a bad book.
Regardless of his intentions, the reviewer must have been aware that his piece
could have had a devastating effect on the sales of the book and Moldea's
future as an author. "[A] harsh review in The New York Times Book Review
is at least as damaging as accusations of incompetence made against an
attorney or a surgeon in a legal or medical journal." '174
By protecting such negative statements so long as they are based on a
"supportable interpretation" of the work being discussed, Moldea Hprovided
a holding more in line with the values of the First Amendment than that of
Moldea . The supportable interpretation standard prevents the dreaded
chilling effect upon harsh criticism, but protects the subject of such
commentary by providing that a supportable interpretation arguably has not
been made if the facts it contains are knowingly or recklessly false. 75 An
author offering published work in the public sector is voluntarily inviting
criticism from those who have made a profession of reviewing such work. It
seems only fair that this type of limited public figure 76 should have to
establish not only that the criticisms include assertions of provable false facts,
but that they were published with the actual malice required under
Sullivan77 and the cases which followed it.'78 Given the tenuous nature
of defining apparently subjective terms and the rare cases in which the critic
actually will know or harbor great doubt about the conclusions put forth in his
commentary, the barrier to these sorts of defamation actions constructed by the
Moldea court will rarely be hurdled. Consequentially, those who practice in
172. Paul M. Barrett, In Rare Reversal, Court Blocks Libel Suit Over Book
Review, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1994, at B1.
173. Moldea, 15 F.3d at 1142.
174. Id. at 1146.
175. Moldea , 22 F.3d at 315.
176. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENMmENT § 11.01[2] (1994) (citing Gertz,418 U.S. at
349).
177. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-80.
178. See supra notes 42-106 and accompanying text.
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the field of artistic criticism should not be deterred from their mission so long
as they do not engage in the dissemination of purely false or reckless
statements, a result directly in line with the policies behind the First
Amendment.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful Moldea H precluded any future lawsuits
arising from a negative review, given that the "supportable interpretation"
theory is generally untested and appears to have been inspired at least in part
by the Times' own argument in its petition for rehearing." 9 Such issues as
whether all of the facts supporting the interpretation need to be disclosed or
whether the various lower court tests distinguishing fact from opinion still
carry weight may arise in future litigation.
The inherent difficulty of ruling on such issues was exemplified in the
Moldea cases, as the majority of the appeals panel discarded what Moldea's
lawyer called a "very clear, specific, and self-confident" opinion just 10 weeks
after its entry. It is unlikely that the decisions of future courts will be much
easier when faced with similar issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Moldea 1I confronted the difficult question as to when
negative criticism may provide grounds for a defamation suit. The court
provided an answer that should satisfy both supporters and critics of legal
doctrines of free speech. While merely labeling a criticism as opinion does
not create a per se exemption from civil liability, a plaintiff, in order to state
a claim, must show that the critic's interpretation cannot be supported by the
work being reviewed. Such a standard provides some protection to the artist,
while avoiding suppression of the free-flowing debate over the various works
placed before the public eye that is essential to the First Amendment.
DAVID C. VOGEL
179. See Moldea f, 22 F.3d at 315. The D.C. Circuit also acknowledged that
such a test was supported by previous Supreme Court decisions, including Massonv.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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